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1. The Founding Treaties, such as the Treaty of  Rome of  1957 which created the 
European Economic Community (EEC), had a strong economic nature. The EEC 
Treaty pointed at the goal of  “principiology” structuration of  a determined economic 
organisation, namely the one it was intended to build under the European integration. 
This economic nature remains – although more diluted – in the current Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU) which has reformed the precedent 
Treaties.
In fact, the “establishment of  a common market” (later with the Maastricht Treaty, 
“the establishment of  a common market and economic and monetary union”),1 as well as the 
implementation of  a “system ensuring that Competition in the common market is not distorted”2 
are genetic notes of  the EEC Treaty. On the other hand, clearly after 1992 (with the 
Maastricht Treaty), the sense of  the presupposed and intended economic organisation 
was highlighted by the European integration process since the beginning, as it was 
established that, in order to reach the goals (broad, political and intermediary) spelled 
in the original Article 2 EEC Treaty, “the activities of  the Member States and the Community” 
implicated the “adoption of  an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of  Member 
States’ economic policies, on the Internal Market and on the definition of  common objectives, and 
conducted in accordance with the principle of  an open market economy with free Competition”.3
Hence, such a principle4 was reaffirmed expressively, with the Maastricht Treaty 
as an institutional ordering framework of  the action of  the Member States (principle 
of  loyalty) and the institutions. This was an ordering and modelling backdrop for the 
activities of  the Member States and it highlighted the fact that the coordination of  
economic policies, the formulation of  common objectives (of  economic nature) and 
the concretization of  the Internal Market must be conducted in accordance with the 
principle of  free Competition.
Nevertheless, with the Treaty of  Lisbon 2009, attitudes were diluted concerning 
the proclamation of  the Competition nature of  the economic ordination, presupposed 
for the European integration. At least, a downturn relating to the express, clear and 
assumed affirmation of  that principle. Once the expression “open market economy with 
free Competition” is replaced in Article 3 of  the Treaty of  the European Union (TEU) 
by “a highly competitive Social Market Economy, aiming at full employment and social progress 
(…)”, indeed, the “free Competition” and, for instance, the “not distorted market” became 
expressions that, with Lisbon, were moved to a place of  less immediate visibility, since 
without disappearing from the acquis communautaire – with consolidated foundations 
in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU – were remitted, in terms of  listing attributions and 
objectives of  the Union, from the aforementioned Article 3 TEU to, currently, the 
Protocol on Internal Market and Competition, appended to the Treaties.5 
1 Article 2, EEC Treaty, 1957. 
2 Article 3(f) – latter, with Maastricht, paragraph g – of  the EEC Treaty, 1957. 
3 Article 4(1), EC Treaty, version introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. However, the original version of  
the aforementioned Article 2, Treaty of  Rome EEC, of  1957, read the following: “The Community shall 
have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of  Member 
States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of  economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of  the standard of  living and closer relations between 
the States belonging to it”.
4 The aforementioned principle of  “an open market economy with free competition” that is the principle of  
competition. 
5 Protocol No. 27, on internal market and competition: “Considering that the internal market as set out in 
Article 3 of  the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted, have agreed 
that: to this end, the Union shall, if  necessary, take action under the provisions of  the Treaties, including under 
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It must be clarified, then, that the formula of  the TEU of  the “social economy 
market” – mostly if  such formula along with the moving of  the express affirmation 
of  the principle of  competition to the Annex 27 – meant a change of  sense of  the 
economic (and political) organisation of  the Union.6
Was the Lisbon Treaty intended to be a shift from the so-called “economic constitution” 
of  the Union? How can one characterise now, as a consequence, this (post-Lisbon) 
“economic constitution” of  the integration?
2. I believe that such dislocation of  the narrative focus of  the principle of  
competition7 from the primary law to a Protocol appended to the Treaties did not 
coincide with an ideological or political-constitutional change of  European integration. 
I would say that despite the apparent devaluation of  the principle of  competition 
(which could suggest a discomfort relating to the clear affirmation of  the principle) in 
the expositive method of  the Treaties, the economic order of  the integrated Europe 
has not substantially changed. The presupposition of  the economic organisation 
(of  the Internal Market), based on a Cosmovision and a “Principiology”, essentially a 
capitalist and competitive promoter of  the economic freedom, seeing economy as the 
manifestation of  the enterprises’ self-determination of  entrepreneurs and consumers, 
was not affected at its core, namely, in terms of  the praxis of  the institutions (for 
example, the European Commission) and the case-law of  the Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union (CJEU).
The placing of  the principle of  competition and the permanent construction of  
an open economy out of  the main text of  the Treaty was not directly related to eventual 
new imperatives of  economic organisation of  the integration itself, but instead, at 
least in a significant part, to the satisfaction of  an internal political narrative in some 
Member States that, therefore, tried to justify some positions more protectionist and 
less integrative with which their respective public opinions began to confront.
Besides, the mismatch between the success of  the economic integration and 
the pursuit of  social policies that satisfy populations is evident to the generality of  
observers and citizens – and that balance is in disfavour of  the action and the social 
policies of  the Union. The rawness of  the affirmation of  the principle of  competition 
may have intimidated some political decision-makers. For it the affirmation of  a “Social 
Article 352 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union. This protocol shall be annexed to the Treaty 
on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union”. 
6 It should be noted that the “Social Market Economy” was an expression already used in the draft 
Constitutional Treaty itself. In this respect, I find particularly valuable the comment of  Vital Moreira, 
of  24th of  November 2004, about the then project of  Constitutional Treaty (not yet rejected in the 
French and Dutch referenda in 2005) and on some of  the criticism that were addressed to that project: 
“Em primeiro lugar, as políticas da UE devem ser agora prosseguidas à luz dos novos princípios fundamentais da 
nova Constituição europeia (se ela for para a frente), onde se contam expressamente os objetivos de justiça social, de 
progresso social, de pleno emprego, de desenvolvimento sustentável, de combate contra a exclusão social, entre outros 
(Article I-3º). Não é por acaso que no novo texto o modelo económico da UE passa a ser designado por 
‘economia social de mercado’, uma antiga expressão de origem alemã que pretende justamente marcar a diferença entre o 
chamado ‘capitalismo renano’, que incorpora o modelo social europeu, e o capitalismo liberal de matriz anglo-saxónica, 
especialmente o norte-americano. A não ser que se pretenda afastar a economia de mercado, em favor de qualquer 
economia ‘socialista’ planificada, a nova noção constitui um evidente progresso sob o ponto de vista da ‘Europa social’”. 
Vital Moreira, article Constituição Europeia e Europa Social, published and disseminated online, in Aba 
da Causa, 24th of  November 2004, available on: http://aba-da-causa.blogspot.pt/2004/11/constituio-
europeia-e-europa-social.html (accessed on 31st of  January 2017). 
7 Or returning to the expression, for instance, consolidated with Maastricht, of  “open market economy 
with free competition”. 
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Market Economy” meant also a political message: The Union and the integration process 
are focused on overtaking social problems. They have an objective to satisfy the social 
cohesion, as the market and the market economy in Europe must also ensure the 
preservation of  the Welfare State and the “European Social Model” (or at least should not 
be a risk factor to it).
The declarations of  the former President of  France, Nicolas Sarkozy, are well 
known. He was one of  the main defenders of  the removal of  the expression “free 
competition” (principle of  competition) of  the text of  the Treaty and claimed that:
“Sur le fond (…) nous avons obtenu une réorientation majeure des objectifs 
de l’Union. La concurrence n’est plus un objectif  de l’Union ou une fin en soi, 
mais un moyen au service du marché intérieur. (…) Je crois à la concurrence 
comme un moyen et pas une fin en soi. Cela va peut-être aussi donner une 
jurisprudence différente à la Commission. Celle d’une concurrence qui est 
là pour favoriser l’émergence de champions européens, pour porter une 
véritable politique industrielle. (…) il ne s’agissait pas de faire un Traité 
d’économie ou le Traité du libéralisme. (…) Il s’agissait de tourner le dos à 
l’idéologie, au dogme et à la naïveté”.8
It is interesting to notice that, instead of  what this declaration seems to mean, 
the competition policy under the European integration process and, consequently, the 
Union, has never seen the competition as an absolute goal. In fact, noticeably and 
markedly, at least until the entry into force of  the Regulation 1/2003, the defence of  
competition was always subordinated to the major goal of  the construction of  the 
Internal Market.
One of  the characteristic features of  that European policy, compared with the 
American antitrust, lies precisely in this point: A policy and a law of  competition has 
always been part of  the Union, assuming that the competition itself  is an instrument 
at the service of  wider goals of  economic policy and/or of  goals of  non-economic 
nature (such as the promotion and the defence of  employment, technological 
development or protection of  large interests of  consumers). Frequently, it is pointed 
out that the position of  the European policy and law of  competition is reverent to 
a vision of  “competition-means” and not of  “competition-condition” (which marks the 
American perspective). Article 101(3) TFEU illustrates the fact the competition is not 
an absolute end under the European Law as it enshrines what the legal doctrine calls 
“economic balance judgment”, which justifies and not qualifies as illicit, certain behaviour 
that, a priori, could be subsumed into the category of  infringing entente of  competition 
[Article 101(1) and (2) TFEU]. On the other hand, in the statement by Sarkozy of  
2007,9 there is still a sort of  return to the past, namely to the first years of  integration, 
as competition is associated to the emergence of  an industrial policy of  the Union 
that would favour the “champions européens” – that is the appearance of  more European 
companies able to impose themselves competitively worldwide. In fact, this was also 
the defining configuration of  the industrial policy prescribed by the EEC during the 
8 See Nicolas Sarkozy, Conférence de presse à l’issue du Conseil européen, 23 juin 2007: http://www.
elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/conferences-de-presse/2007/conference-de-presse-a-l-issue-du-
conseil.5856.html. 
9 See note 8. 
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first years of  the integration.10
3. Returning to Article 3 TEU, as I have assigned, it has taken the stage, in the 
formulation of  the Treaty with Lisbon, the express assertion of  the objective of  
building “a highly competitive Social Market Economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress”, relegating to the aforementioned Protocol No. 27 the “undistorted competition”.
The concept of  “Social Market Economy” has its origins and its affirmation/
diffusion in the German economic policies of  the post-war under the influence of  the 
ordoliberal thought.
Nowadays, the expression is largely used to appoint any kind of  State intervention, 
in the economic domain, with the purpose of  benefiting the most vulnerable. It has 
received, then, in standard terms, a relatively assisting meaning and of  social-economic 
protection. Yet, the concept of  “Social Market Economy” had originally an accurate 
theoretical meaning, referring to a determined model of  socio-economic organisation 
and a political-ideological view that, to a large extent, influenced the European 
integration process. It is originally a formulation resulting from the German ordo-
liberalism and distinct also by the social Catholic thought. Irrespective of  this, with the 
several visions and different ways of  materialising the aspects of  the so-called “Social 
Market Economy” as a model of  social and economic organisation, it is possible to say 
that, in its grounds, there is a concern of  reaching a high level of  social cohesion. Deep 
down, organising the economic functioning according to the criteria and imperatives 
of  a “Social Market Economy” was, in the ordoliberal perspective, the proper way (the 
best one) to ensure such cohesion.11
The inclusion, within the Treaty of  Lisbon, of  the expression “Social Market 
Economy” in Article 3 TEU, notwithstanding the internal politics motivations that could 
justify the use of  that expression (undervaluing co-respective and apparently the free 
Competition) took place in a context of  reform of  the Treaties, after the unsuccessful 
attempt of  re-founding the process of  integration with a “Draft Constitutional Treaty 
(CT)” and in the period of  turbulence after the financial crisis of  2008 – turbulence and 
worry already felt during the process, leading to the adoption of  the Treaty of  Lisbon 
that would end up later, outbursting in the sovereign debt crisis of  some Member States 
in the Euro zone (namely, Portugal). Hence, despite the unequivocal allusion to “Social 
Market Economy” in Article 3 TEU (after Lisbon), and in replacement of  the “free and 
undistorted competition” formula, it was necessary to create a normative speech (rhetoric?) 
that could satisfy some circumstances of  internal politics. It should be assessed now – a 
few years after the Treaty of  Lisbon – if  indeed there have been an approximation to the 
ordoliberal views in terms of  practice and the path followed since then by integration 
– namely in response to the financial crisis after 2008. The leads to the answer to the 
question supra – how to characterise, now (post-Lisbon), the economic constitution 
of  the integration? – might be collected and assessed in the light of  this hypothesis: 
was or was not there an approximation (to some a return) to the original ordoliberal 
vision of  the so-called “economic constitution” of  the Union – namely in response to the 
10 Such vision – privileging the growth and the increase of  world competitiveness of  the 
European industry ended up delaying in the context of  the integration the regulation of  economic 
concentration operations. Indeed, only in 1989 the first Regulation in that matter was created, 
Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 on the control of  concentrations between undertakings. 
11 See for example, Christian Joerges and Florian Rodl, Social Market Economy as Europe’s Social 
Model, EUI, Working Paper Law, No. 2004/8, available on: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/2823/?sequence=1 (accessed on 10 of  January 2017).
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2017
114 Pedro Madeira Froufe
political demands of  priority attention to the social component (the defence and the 
strengthening of  the so-called “European Social Model”)?
Indeed, one of  the factors that is frequently seen as responsible, to a large extent, 
for some distancing of  the populations from the Union and the process of  integration 
is the aforementioned mismatch between the economic slope lato sensu (the economic 
integration itself  and its progresses, here included the single monetary policy) and 
the social action/intervention of  the Union. The problem of  unemployment and 
the alleged scarce capacity of  being developed, at the European level, policies of  
support and social intervention, comparatively with the intensity and the advancements 
of  the economic integration and (mostly) monetary might be factors of  distancing 
and disinterest of  the European citizens concerning integration. In this context, the 
distancing would strengthen the feeling of  exclusion even more, of  non-participation 
in the functioning of  the Union and, as a consequence, of  lack of  democracy (the 
alleged and often repeated “democratic deficit” of  the Union). Well, irrespective the fairness 
and the prosperity of  this criticism, it is interesting to frame whether the economic 
constitution of  the Union has it or has not, it in consideration, been either a response 
to the criticism or, instead, part of  the problem.
4. The concept of  “economic constitution” that it is normally used, has its origins in 
the ordoliberal thought as well.
It is certain that, in a purely economic and descriptive sense, the economic 
constitution means “economic order”; it describes the type of  economic relations that are 
established. It is equivalent (the economic constitution) to the real economic order.
Yet, the economic constitution also refers to a concept that surpasses the 
descriptive sense of  real economic order (the description of  the existing economic 
relations that characterise the functioning of  an economy). There is a normative sense 
(traditional) that is reflected in a “principiologic” frame, written or not, which structures 
and fundaments the economic orders of  the states. It is the Fundamental Law that 
orders the economy. It is, at the bottom, an area of  the Constitution, a set of  existing 
norms in the Constitutions that implement the institutional frames which order the 
economic functioning.12
In that regard, the regular classifications and qualifications developed by the 
doctrine apply.
There is nonetheless a formal economic constitution (reporting to the set 
of  normative principles inscribed in the written Fundamental Law) and a material 
economic constitution. In this last acceptation, the sense of  economic constitution 
is close to what, some authors call, a mixed conception of  (economic) constitution. 
Economic constitution in this mixed notion – that is, legal and economic – would 
integrate the set of  principles and norms indispensable to the creation and guarantee 
of  the functioning of  an economic order (real economic functioning) considered 
12 “O conceito tradicional de constituição refere-se ao estatuto do Estado como pessoa coletiva, como corporação, e 
o seu objeto é a indicação dos órgãos dessa associação, a distribuição de competências entre eles, e as relações com 
os ‘súbditos’”. (…) “Com efeito, a partir do momento em que se possa afirmar que a economia e o estado não 
representam já dois planos autónomos, que se dissolveu a tradicional separação estado-sociedade, o conceito de 
constituição económica deixa de ser um elemento estranho no quadro tradicional da constituição do estado. Esta é 
necessariamente também constituição da economia” – Vital Moreira, Economia e Constituição in Boletim de 
Ciências Económicas. Suplemento ao Boletim da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, 
Volume XIX (1976), 6 e 8. For the concept of  economic constitution, Capítulo V – Constituição 
Económica e Constituição Política. 
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desirable and politically chosen by a certain community (state or politically organised 
community).13 It is a substantial meaning of  economic constitution (it overtakes the 
formal constitution) and in it, the norms of  the formal constitution relating to the 
ordering of  the economy are incorporated. Not only those, but also other rules, such 
as the ones in ordinary or derivative legislation that, for its scope, contribute decisively 
for the design and the implementation of  that intended economic order (at the bottom, 
for the construction of  the model of  economic functioning that was the object of  the 
political-constitutional option of  that organised community).
It is common in this approach (substantial, mixed) of  the economic constitution to 
wonder which economic system is in place and/or is intended to order the functioning 
of  the economy. The economic system is, in a certain way, the typical object of  the 
economic constitutions. The economic system must be understood as, not only the 
rules and the institutions that provide guidance and sense to the legal ordering of  the 
economy, but also the political and ideological option, the principles and values and 
even the sociological reality which (simultaneously) frames and determines socially 
that constitution. Therefore, the economic systems are at the same time, object and a 
determining factor of  consolidation of  a substantial economic constitution and derive 
from the “socio-economic system”. I shall not develop here the theory of  economic systems 
(and, thus, of  socio-economic systems) nor the meanings of  their diverse categories. 
I will then accept the approach suggested by Sousa Franco and Oliveira Martins: the 
systems are “typical and global forms of  organisation and functioning of  the economy, based on a 
number of  fundamental principles that rule economies with distinct structures. They derive from the 
concept, broader, of  social system (…). We may talk about abstract or concrete systems, according to a 
higher or lower degree of  abstraction with which the respective principles are conceived, as informing and 
interpreting models of  different social realities”.14
5. It is relevant now, considering the issues raised previously,15 to provide the 
context of  the ordoliberal thought and its influence in the European integration process.
Ordo-liberalism, associated with the denominated “Freiburg school”, begins to be 
known as of  the 1930s, with authors as Walter Eucken, Franz Bohm and Alfred Muller-
Armack (who would afterwards assume a political role in post-war Germany), among 
others. It is a school of  liberal thought, even though it has come up as criticiser and 
attempter of  excelling the imperfections of  the classical liberal view. It has its climax, 
in terms of  diffusion and adherence (even if  mostly in the political, intellectual and 
ruling elites) in Germany after the war. Hence, it is not odd that it was profoundly 
marked by the German reality then and the respective concerns of  reconstruction and 
normal insertion of  Germany in the new international order. The ordoliberal thought 
at first was also significantly influenced by the social vision of  the Catholic Church 
(social doctrine of  the Church). This initial ordoliberal thought (part of  the named 
13 Josef  Drexl, La Constitution Economique Europénne – L’actualité du modèle ordoliberal, in Revue 
International de Droit Economique, 2011/4, tomo XXV, 419 a 454. Drexl, for example, follows 
Nipperdey to approach the mixed concept of  economic constitution. Nipperdey H.C., Die 
Grundprinzipien des Wirtschaftsverfassungsrechts, in Recht – Staat – Wirtschaft, vol. III (1951) 223-225. 
14 António L. Sousa Franco e Guilherme D’Oliveira Martins, A Constituição Económica Portuguesa. 
Ensaio Interpretativo (Coimbra: Almedina, 1993), 26 e 27. 
15 That is, how to characterise nowadays and after the Treaty of  Lisbon, the economic constitution 
of  the EU; I investigate if  the inclusion in the TEU, with Lisbon and quite emphatically, of  the 
social market economy matched an intended shift of  sense in the economic organisation of  
integration. 
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German liberalism) considered itself  as a sort of  third way between socialism and 
classic capitalism from the 18th century. Naturally, it is about a philosophical, legal and 
economic view deeply embedded in the German context of  the post-war and all the 
traumas lived by the generation of  its first cultivators and defenders.16
There are some driving forces that, in simple terms, can draft the ordoliberal’s 
Cosmovision. I will list them synthetically.
6. Ordoliberals, more than trying to create an efficient economic functioning (in 
a strictly and reductively economic sense) were concerned, especially, with creating an 
economic order that could prevent the flaws of  the market and ensure the necessary 
conditions for society in general, and the individuals in particular, to benefit from a life 
condition globally decent. 
This economic order should be laid in principles of  democracy and, at the bottom, 
it would be an ideal order, an ethos17 that would also be political and social.
In the end, it would be an integral, just and balanced order while being, naturally, 
democratic and also, able to be efficient from the exclusive economic point of  view. 
The ordoliberal perspective does not segregate the question of  the economic efficiency 
from justice and democracy. Furthermore, it would not be efficient an order that, from 
the economic point of  view, were balanced (providing for institutionally the market’s 
flaws) and did not guarantee the dignity of  the individual.
To the ordoliberals, (and the authors I have mentioned and could be named 
first generation ordoliberals) the policy of  monopolisation of  the German economy 
promoted by the Nazi regime reflected the nature and the totalitarian principles that 
marked the economic order and planning of  the national-socialism. Moreover, such 
policy was the economic mainstay of  that totalitarianism which annulled the dignity of  
individuals. The monopolised economy was identified as the economic support of  the 
Nazi regime.
Therefore, as protecting the dignity of  the individuals, the political and democratic 
freedoms against totalitarian drifts of  any kind or nature was a priority, it was fundamental 
to architect such an order based on a regime that would protect the economic freedoms 
and would disable, for its own setting, the monopolies or processes of  economic 
concentration leading to the monopolisation of  the economy. In this perspective, the 
individual’s freedom and economic freedom were deemed essential imperatives for the 
construction of  the ideal order; competition then became a necessary condition so that 
monopolist drifts and, consequently, totalitarian political drifts, could be prevented.
So it is understood the importance of  the competition law (in its conception of  a 
law of  the defence of  competition). This set of  principles and rules assumed a decisive 
importance in all ordoliberal thought and had a quasi-constitutional status. At the core, 
16 For a general description of  the main features of  the ordoliberal thought and the main problems 
and criticisms, see for example, Philippe Nemo and Jean Petitot, Histoire du libéralisme en Europe 
(1ere edit.) (Paris: PUF, 2006) 1002 – 1030. I cite the following extract: “La meilleure façon de decrire son 
héritage (de l’ordoliberalisme) serait peut-être de le qualifier de kantien (…) En ce qui concerne l’économie, il n’est 
guère possible de comprendre les travaux de Eucken et Bohm sans prendre en compte le clima intelectuel et politique 
de l’Alemagne. (…) Eucken s’est efforcé de trouver ses propres marques en surmontant la ‘grande antinomie’ entre 
l’approche historique et individuelle de l’ècole historique et l’approche ‘théorique et génerale’ de l’ècole marginaliste. (…) 
Ils ont ressenti profondément la necessité de reorganiser les institutions et de redéfinir les relations entre État et societé – 
dont l’interpenétration avait été une cause récurrente dês ‘routes de la servitude’ allemandes. Cette experience pourrait 
expliquer le scepticisme qu’ils ont manifesté à l’égard de l’idée de Hayek d’une évolution spontanée des institutions”. 
17 Therefore, necessarily, it would also be a valuing and normative order. 
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the competition order was placed (using the orders terminology) in the same spot as the 
democratic order (or at least the former as sine qua non condition of  the latter).
7. As is apparent from what I have written above on some of  the features of  the 
ordoliberal thought, the interdependence of  the economic, legal and social orders (that 
is an integrated, unitary view of  all those orders)18  was an essential mark, common to all 
authors who were part of  that German school of  liberal thought. Such interdependence, 
creator of  an integral, balanced (fair) vision, became one of  the fundamental theoretical 
concepts of  ordo-liberalism (interdependence of  orders). According to this concept, 
the economic order is integrated in a context that expresses the symbiosis of  the social 
order, the political and constitutional order and the juridical order. In this perspective, 
the economic policy – any concrete economic policy – cannot be guided exclusively by 
the criterion of  efficiency strictly economic. It must as well be a factor of  transposition 
of  constitutional values to the life of  citizens.
One important aspect to highlight is this: law itself  depends on the existing 
economic order, even though it also models and implements it. The juridical institutions 
or institutional frameworks designed by law have an impact and a social reach that 
depends on the configuration of  that existing order (economic). It is the case of  private 
property and the contractual freedom. Either in an order nourished and reflective of  the 
pure “laissez-faire, laissez passer” typical of  the 18th century or in a competition economic 
order, in the meaning given by ordo-liberalism, those institutions are determining (both 
orders share those institutions or institutional framework). Yet, in the ordoliberals view, 
only in an order effectively competitive can the private property be acceptable generally 
for and by all citizens, even if  many do not possess it.
The economic theory of  modern industrial organisation upholds competition 
mostly on grounds of  economic efficiency (the market is the main institution of  
efficiency) and through this, it protects consumer welfare. In other words, consumer 
welfare is considered, before all, a factor that favours functionally the competition and, 
as a consequence, is the promotor of  a greater economic efficiency. Nonetheless, in the 
ordoliberal perspective, in an effective competition economic order, it should protect, 
first, the freedom of  the consumer as a result of  the individual freedom and against the 
totalitarian power of  the monopolies, regardless of  their role in the market. That being 
the case, consumer welfare is equally safeguarded, though having a different starting 
point and motivation when compared to the presuppositions of  consumer welfare as 
defended functionally by the theory of  modern industrial organisation.
To the initial ordo-liberalism, competition takes the nature of  structuring the 
principles of  the order, not only economic principles, but also political and social 
principles. It is certain still that the strict economic efficiency is not in foreground 
but the guarantee in favour of  social cohesion, individual freedom and human life’s 
dignity, which motivate the importance of  free competition. The competition principle 
is an almost absolute principle and, to a certain extent, universally unquestionable. The 
competition order is necessarily democratic and as long as it is an effectively competitive 
order, it prevents monopolies and totalitarianisms. In this formula, it makes sense of  
the concept of  “Social Market Economy”.
8. To Alfred Muller-Armack, who was an official of  the Ministry of  Economy 
of  the Federal Republic of  Germany as of  1952 and Secretary of  State in charge of  
18 Interdependenz der Ordnungen. 
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the European Affaris, between 1958 and 1963, the “Social Market Economy” was that 
a concept following and modelled by the rules of  the market in free competition, to 
which were added the social guarantees (reflecting, hence, that integral Cosmovision 
and/or interdependence of  orders). It is important to note that Eucken was the first 
person to disseminate such a model of  economy as the one to be adopted by the 
economic policy of  Germany in the post-war period.
Three principles must be highlighted for a global understanding of  what the 
ordoliberals intended with the concept of  “Social Market Economy” (and, if  you please, 
for the understanding of  the Muller-Armack formula of  market economy with social 
guarantees). These three principles emanate from the concept of  interdependence and 
the integral global Cosmovision, typical of  this school of  thought.
Therefore, in order to understand the reach of  the concept of  “Social Market 
Economy” it is relevant to consider the following;
Firstly, the market, the Social Market Economy and the social guarantees (if  we 
like out of  simplification we could say “European Social Model”) are connected, being the 
two sides of  the same coin. Social guarantees are one condition of  good functioning of  
the market and this is a necessary condition that needs to be present so that it is possible 
to talk about social security. Social order and market economy are simultaneously part 
of  the ideal economic order; none precedes the other, none is more important than the 
other. Only the market economy for being indeed the most efficient has the conditions 
to assure the rights and social protection. Only the market and the market economy, 
despite the unbalances they create, may generate more wealth and, for this, produce 
conditions to facilitate a better and more vast redistribution of  that generated wealth.
Secondly, the interconnection and complementarity among market economy, the 
market itself  and a system of  social guarantees explain the application of  the principle 
of  subsidiarity, which defines the social measures considered necessary at each time. 
In other words, the definition and the application of  a social policy must follow logic 
of  subsidiarity regarding the market: only concrete actions of  social nature that adhere 
to the functioning of  the market economy should be adopted. Still, the social policy 
should only interfere with the functioning of  the free market if  the actions equivalent 
to those whose adoption is intended cannot be generated by the functioning of  the 
market.
In this perspective, competition law is the Fundamental Law of  Social Market 
Economy: this law, insofar as it grants and protects the competition order and prevents 
monopolist processes and hinders the positions of  market dominance, contributes to a 
fairer and more equal distribution of  wealth. It prevents that the market is captured by 
abusive and harmful economic powers towards the interests of  the citizens/consumers, 
namely the poorer. Thus, the competition order and the respective law that upholds it 
are the fundamental elements of  the ordoliberal Cosmovision and the Social Market 
Economy.
Thirdly, the indispensability of  competition law to establish itself  and develop a 
Social Market Economy does not dismiss a social policy (e.g. State Intervention) with 
proper actions to the assurance of  a satisfactory level of  life and socio-economic well-
being of  the citizens.19
19 Synthetically: “L’économie de marché moderne n’est pas l’économie de marché libre des flibustiers libéraux d’une 
époque révolue [...] mais une économie de marché à engagement social qui permet à l’individu de s’épanouir, qui 
accorde la priorité à la valeur de la personnalité et qui récompense la performance avec un rendement mérité”. Ludwig 
Erhard, Congres du CDU, Recklinghausen, 28th August 1948, in Economie Sociale de Marché. Qu’este-ce 
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9. Returning to the concept of  mixed economic constitution (economic and 
normative, reflecting a material or substantial view), it is now relevant to underline a 
conclusion that comes with a relative ease: the understanding of  the mixed economic 
constitution matches the initial ordoliberal vision.
The logic of  socio-economic integrity, of  interdependence of  orders, the fact that 
this legal framework of  the economy ordering (real economic order) point at a balance 
and a guarantee of  social protection – considering the defence of  competition and 
competition law as cornerstone (almost as Fundamental Law, as I stated) of  the whole 
of  the socio-economic and political system – are emanations and results of  ordoliberal 
thought and Cosmovision. In that regard, the very notion of  economic constitution has 
its origins in this (neo)liberal German thought.
The virtuosity of  this understanding of  economic constitution lies precisely in 
its interdependence nature, in its integral approach of  reality as its object. A normative 
analysis and vision which methodologically has as its starting point, the sociologic 
reality, the concerns and concrete interests of  the populations, of  groups of  interest, 
conflicts (antagonisms) and consensuses that create political moves and disputes, I 
would say that a normative approach – realistic – will always provide more efficient 
and more effective legal-social responses. To a certain extent, I recall on this matter the 
posthumous work of  Max Weber, Economy and Society, in which a sociological approach 
is developed (sociology of  law) that is proposed as one of  the fundamental basis of  the 
enhancement of  juridical analysis and action.
On the other hand, such approach of  ordoliberal basis of  the economic 
constitution presents another supplementary advantage, or at least a compromise that 
might be an advantage – especially in terms of  the European integration. Transposing 
that approach to the dimension of  the EU constitution, that integrated (interdependent) 
constitutional understanding prevents us from falling into an excessively mechanical 
and technical approach.
The EU constitution (or even better the constitution of  the European integration) 
may not be restricted to a set of  rules that define a law and an order of  integration 
only in technical-legal sense. There is, sometimes, the tendency to circumscribe that 
constitution to fundamental rules and principles of  the Treaties and of  the case-law that 
ensure the dialogue between the orders of  European source and national source. This 
constitution is often limited to the so-called principles of  “Juridical Federalism” (primacy, 
direct effect, direct applicability) or of  principles that are shown without a sense and 
a social, political and ideological option, such as loyalty, subsidiarity, equivalence, 
interpretation in conformity, effective judicial protection and liability for the breach 
of  EU law. Other principles of  substantial nature are added to those and originate and 
frame some common policies as the ones of  economic freedoms in the Internal Market 
(freedom of  movement) and the rules of  defence of  the competition, always stressing 
the technical aspect, distant from the social and political model that should support the 
European construction.
It is clear that the protection of  fundamental rights and the affirmation of  the 
Union as a Union based on the rule of  law20 as well as, especially due to case-law boost, 
que cela signifie concretement, ed. Siegrefied F. Franke e David Gregosz, Konnrad Adenaur Stiftung, (2013) 
(available on: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/11312-1442-3-30.pdf   accessed on 13th  January 2017). 
20 On the principles of  the integration law and the principle of  the Union based on the rule of  law, 
see Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de Direito da União Europeia. Doutrina e Jurisprudência, 2nd ed. (Lisboa: 
Quid Juris, 2011).
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the densification of  European citizenship as a citizenship of  rights, counterbalance that 
(eventual) risk of  slippage to a constitution vision of  the integration that is excessively 
neutral, apparently technical and out of  touch with the political reality and the concrete 
sociological basis that gives life and materiality to the Union and the European 
construction. Yet, by definition, the ordoliberal economic constitution grounded in the 
interdependence of  the orders and realities incorporates the social component in the 
balance of  efficiency of  law and the constitution of  economy (real economic order or 
competition order) and always impose on us a vision and an embodiment of  the idea of  
the economic constitution making a commitment with the social slope and, to a certain 
extent, connected with the expectations and aspirations of  the citizens.21
10. The Treaty of  Rome of  1957 (and, to a certain extent, its predecessor Treaty 
of  Paris of  1951) and the project of  European integration launched by it, had many 
affinities with the ordoliberal thought. The ordoliberal standpoint, particularly in the 
post-war German perspective, seemed especially suitable to the political legitimisation 
of  the same project.
The freedoms of  movement instituted and assured by the Treaty (the economic 
freedoms of  the Internal Market, then common market), the principle of  non-
discrimination on grounds of  nationality, the introduction of  a competition order 
– from the normative and principiological vantage point – supported by rules that 
substantiated a law of  the defence of  Competition, all of  that could be understood as 
structural pillars of  an ordoliberal economic constitution, associated by the German 
decision-making elites with an dissuasive obstacle against totalitarianisms. The openness 
of  the economy (of  the economies of  the Member States) fitted the German concerns 
of  rebuilding and normalising its relations with the international community. Such 
ordoliberal affinity – which meant a comfortable political architecture of  the integration 
to the German political decision-makers of  then – was not disturbed by other rules and 
policies of  notorious anti-competition nature and contrary to the ordoliberal vision, as 
it was the case, for instance, of  the Common Agricultural Policy. Those disadvantages 
were largely compensated by the competition slant and the tune of  economic freedom 
of  the Treaty. From the point of  view of  democratic political legitimacy, the fact that 
the main instrument adopted for the European construction is of  economic nature 
(that is, the construction of  a Common Market), led to the edification of  a competition 
order, which would later prove to be a decisive remark.22
Europe, therefore, committed with the construction of  a market that overlapped 
significantly with the Nation States. That market and the rules that enforced it pointed at 
an order that ensured free competition, managed by supranational organs (institutions) 
– organs whose political legitimacy would be from the beginning justified by the basis 
21 A different problem and that may lead to other discussions is the concrete identification of  
which desires and aspirations are those; which priorities of  life and real interests groups (and what 
groups?) of  citizens have. Here, the risks are always those of  excess of  proselytism in favour of  
certain position or vision strictly subjective of  the interpreter. The risk in fact of  turning an alleged 
normative vision into a propaganda speech – this also out of  reality and away from the generality 
of  citizens. Yet, this difficult interpretation and discussion is not even on the table if  we explore 
concepts as economic constitution (and constitution of  the EU) with a reducing technical and 
specialized logic. 
22 Going back to what I have state: the principle of  competition is an almost absolute principle and, 
to a certain extent, universally unquestionable. The competition order is necessarily democratic and 
a long as it is an effectively competitive order it prevents monopolies and totalitarianisms.  
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and the technical-economic objective they pursued: the establishment of  the Common 
Market of  competition nature and founded in the economic freedoms.
In other words, that objective of  the institutions and the very European 
construction was also the instrument to achieve the competition order that supported 
and dissuaded eventual pressures and totalitarian and anti-democratic dangers. We had 
the construction of  a supranational competition order that conceptually and, from the 
values perspective, was justified. A competitive order and a market that overlapped 
the states and the question of  national democratic legitimacy. In a certain sense, the 
universal character (and in the ordoliberal perspective) was naturally insuperable of  
the competition order, exempted the European project (economic, competition and 
supranational) of  the burden of  national democratic political legitimacy.
It was foreseen that a path with the first Treaties would be aimed at the states 
being under the surveillance of  a supranational competition market and not of  a market 
controlled by states. In that regard, the affinities amongst the European project, ordo-
liberalism and the German post-war view were evident.
This idea is also highlighted by Christian Joerges and Florian Rodl, to whom the 
fact of  Europe began its integration process with an objective and a track, apparent and 
solely, economic progressively gave plausibility to the ordoliberal statements.
The former Communities were underpinned in terms of  legitimisation in the 
construction and solidification of  an order that strived and developed the economic 
freedom and the guarantee of  free competition, independent of  the legitimacy of  the 
institutions of  the democratic National States and that, despite the integration being, as 
a concept, antagonist to the ordoliberal ideas. Indeed, at first look, the idea of  building 
an order merely economic, disconnected from its socio-political surroundings as well 
as the lack of  acquisition ways of  democratic legitimacy to this order, integration 
would have not been considered proper by ordoliberals. However, the perspective was 
progressively adjusted to the imperative of  building a path that aimed at the competition 
order. In fact, “[t]his legitimacy was independent of  the state’s democratic constitutional institutions. 
By the same token it imposed limits upon the Community, discretionary economic policies seemed 
illegitimated and unlawful”23
11. Those integrating aspects of  the ray of  influences determinants of  the idea 
and the implementation of  European integration allow us to verify and understand 
the weight and importance of  some policies – such as the policy (and the law) of  
competition – which have always had an impact on the effectiveness of  the integration 
itself  and the Union law. They also allow us to justify the construction of  a (legal) 
economic order which has always rejected competition (entire of  itself) as an absolute 
principle. Rather than the American tradition and jus-competition Cosmovision, in the 
European space and in the scope of  the European economic integration, it has never 
been adopted as a model of  policy and normative system that would enshrine the 
so-called theory of  competition-condition. The European sensitiveness and tradition 
have always pursued a relativization of  strictly economic principles (deriving or leading 
to a more productive efficiency), considering them, above all, as instrumental in 
relation to broader objectives, political and social included. Article 101(3), TFEU and 
the long decisional and case-law practice of  European Commission and the CJEU 
in the application of  this normative (economic balance judgment) illustrate just that. 
There is a Cosmovision that is relatively reformist and integral (pointing, in a way, to 
23 Christian Joerges and Florian Rodl, Social Market Economy as Europe’s Social Model?...,  5-6. 
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the interpenetration of  orders) that marks the action of  the institutions. Economic 
freedom and the institutional frameworks of  capitalism have always been mitigated 
with concerns that go beyond the (strict) economic efficiency, in the definition and 
pursuit of  common policies.
In that regard, the exceptions (and its causes) admitted to the economic freedoms 
are understood: for instance, in the context of  the free movement of  goods, Article 36 
TFEU; the public policy/order, the public security and the public health in the context 
of  the free movement of  workers [Article 45(3) TFEU] and the right of  establishment 
[Article 52(1) TFEU].
Therefore, the introduction and the prominence attributed to the Social Market 
Economy with the Lisbon Treaty might, in a way, mean a rekindling (a firmer and 
clearer assumption) of  this original ordoliberal influence or legacy. The social 
dimension (social cohesion), for example, in this ordoliberal Cosmovision has never 
been diminished and, instead of  a perspective (ideology?) is more anchored in the 
productive efficiency (strictly economic) and in a capitalist model, closer to the classic 
thought from the 18th century, its preservation. This (the preservation of  such social 
cohesion) is an imperative of  the competitive/economic order that is intended to be 
reached in this ordoliberal vision.
The Social Market Economy – and its prominence in terms of  normative 
enunciation signalled and acquired with the Lisbon Treaty – rather than indicate a shift 
in the sense of  the economic constitution of  the EU, it might just refer to a return to 
some of  the origins of  the integration process (origins – rectius, original influences – 
always implied in this process).
This idea of  a return to the ordoliberal origins/influences will be specially 
interesting and relevant if  we give it the context now in a post-Brexit phase and when 
we move forward with an institutional debate started by the Commission on the future 
of  Europe.24
24 European Commission – White Paper on the Future of  Europe. Reflections and Scenarios for 
the EU27 in 2025, COM(2017)2025 of  1st of  March 2017, available on: https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/white-paper-future-europe-reflections-and-scenarios-eu27, accessed on 3rd April 2017. 
